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Abstract
Lord Slynn of Hadley is probably not primarily known as an environmental lawyer. His
contributions to the development of European environmental law are, however, considerable. On
May 24, 1988, Slynn delivered his famous opinion in the so-called “Danish Bottles” case. In
that case, the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”) held that a system requiring manufacturers and
importers to market beer and soft drinks only in reusable containers (which had to be approved by
a National Agency for the Protection of the Environment) was subject to what is now article 34 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (”TFEU”) since the Lisbon Treaty entered
into force. The importance of this judgment is that it enabled and facilitated the integration of
environmental considerations into the market freedoms of the European Community (later the
European Union). This Essay, in memory of Lord Slynn of Hadley, is therefore devoted to the
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INTRODUCTION 
Lord Slynn of Hadley is probably not primarily known as an 
environmental lawyer.1 His contributions to the development of 
European environmental law are, however, considerable. On May 
24, 1988, Slynn delivered his famous opinion in the so-called 
“Danish Bottles” case.2 In that case, the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ” or “Court”) held that a system requiring manufacturers 
and importers to market beer and soft drinks only in reusable 
containers, which had to be approved by a National Agency for 
the Protection of the Environment, was subject to what is now, 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,3 article 34 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).4 
The requirement implied a prohibition against the marketing of 
goods in containers other than ones which were returnable. The 
importation of foreign beer and soft drinks which were 
legitimately marketed in other Member States, but did not meet 
the requirements of Denmark, the country of importation, was 
thus not possible. Furthermore, the fact of having to establish a 
system for the return of containers meant that foreign 
 
*  Professor of Administrative Law, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. The 
author would like to thank Dr. H.D. Tolsma, Department of Administrative Law and 
Public Administration, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, and Christina A. Wild, 
student-editor of the Review of European Administrative Law, for their helpful comments 
and suggestions on a prior draft of this Essay. 
1. Until 2007, however, he was President of the United Kingdom Environmental 
Law Association (“UKELA”). UKELA, UKELA Patrons, http://www.ukela.org/
rte.asp?id=95 (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
2. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, 
[1988] E.C.R. 4619. 
3. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1. 
4. Article 34 reads: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.” Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 34, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 61 
[hereinafter TFEU]. The corresponding prior provision was article 28 of the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2006 O.J. C 
321 E/37, at 52 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
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manufacturers would be obliged to incur relatively high transport 
costs. 
The basic question in this case was whether the Danish 
government could rely on “the need to protect the environment” 
in order to justify this trade restriction.5 In Cassis de Dijon6 and in 
subsequent cases, it was decided that, in the absence of common 
rules, obstacles to free movement within the European 
Community (“Community” or “EC”) resulting from disparities 
between the national laws must be accepted, in so far as such 
rules, applicable to domestic and imported products without 
distinction, may be recognized as being necessary in order to 
satisfy mandatory requirements recognized by Community law. This 
is known as the “rule of reason” exception.7 In a well-balanced 
and nuanced opinion, Slynn came to the conclusion that 
“national measures taken for the protection of the environment 
are capable of constituting ‘mandatory requirements’ recognized 
by the judgment in Cassis de Dijon as limiting the application of 
article 30 of the [EEC] Treaty [now article 34 TFEU] in the 
absence of Community rules.”8 The Court followed Slynn and 
added “protection of the environment” to its list of justifiable 
mandatory requirements.9 
The importance of this judgment is that it enabled and 
facilitated the integration of environmental considerations into 
the market freedoms of the Community (later the European 
Union (“Union” or “EU”)). This Essay in memory of Lord Slynn 
of Hadley is therefore devoted to the process of integrating 
environmental requirements in other areas. 
I. ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION 
PRINCIPLE 
Article 11 TFEU reads: “Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
 
5. Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles), Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, ¶¶ 
11–12. 
6. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 
Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
7. Cf. JAN. H. JANS & HANS H.B. VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 245–50 
(3d ed. 2007). 
8. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Danish Bottles, Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 
4619, 4622. 
9. Danish Bottles, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, ¶ 9. 
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implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development.”10 It goes 
beyond the scope of this Essay to comprehensively trace back the 
origin of this provision. It suffices to say that elements of it can 
already be found in Principle 13 of the 1972 Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the so-
called “Stockholm Declaration”): 
In order to achieve a more rational management of 
resources and thus to improve the environment, States 
should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to 
their development planning so as to ensure that 
development is compatible with the need to protect and 
improve environment for the benefit of their population.11 
One of the great achievements of the Stockholm Declaration is 
that it acknowledges the strong relation between environmental 
protection and economic development. 
One must be aware that at that time in history, there was no 
European environmental policy at all. Moreover, the word 
“environment” was completely absent in the initial 1957 
European Economic Community Treaty (“EEC Treaty”).12 It 
cannot be a coincidence that in the early 1970’s, and more or less 
parallel to the Stockholm Declaration, matters changed. 
In fact, the starting signal for the development of a 
European environmental policy was given in 1972, when the 
European Council Summit stressed the value of a European 
environmental policy and declared that “Economic expansion, 
which is not an end in itself, must as a priority help to attenuate 
the disparities in living conditions.”13 Therefore, the European 
Council requested that the European institutions draw up an 
action program with a precise schedule before July 31, 1973.14 
 
10. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 11, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53. This replaces EC Treaty, 
supra note 4, art. 6, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 46. 
11. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 13, Report 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at 3, 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972). 
12. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
13. First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community (Paris), Declaration, E.C. 
BULL., no. 10, at 15 (1972). 
14. Id. at 20. 
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The Declaration of the Council of European Communities and 
of the Representatives of the Governments of the Members States 
meeting in the Council of November 22, 1973 on the programme 
of action of the European Communities on the environment 
reads, in part: 
Whereas in particular, in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Treaty, the task of the European Economic Community is to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities and a continuous and 
balanced expansion, which cannot be imagined in the 
absence of an effective campaign to combat pollution and 
nuisances or of an improvement in the quality of life and the 
protection of the environment.15 
Although the term “environmental protection” was not as 
such found in the objectives enumerated in articles 2 and 3 of 
the EEC Treaty in those days,16 the European Council’s 
Declaration in effect meant that, by an extensive interpretation 
of “economic expansion,” which was expressly included as an 
objective, environmental protection could become the subject of 
European decision-making. Henceforth, it integrated 
environmental protection requirements into economic 
development. The latter was to be regarded not only in 
quantitative terms, but also qualitatively. 
The next important phase in “merging environment and 
economics”17 in the European Economic Community (“EEC”) 
commenced on July 1, 1987, the date on which the changes to 
the EEC Treaty brought about by the Single European Act 
(“SEA”) came into force,18 and continued until the Treaty on 
European Union (“Maastricht Treaty”) entered into force.19 
 
15. Declaration of the Council of European Communities and of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Members States meeting in the Council of 22 
November 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the 
Environment, Nov. 22, 1973, 1973 O.J. C 112/1. 
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 12, arts. 2, 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
17. U.N. World Comm’n on Env’t. and Dev., Report of the European Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future, at 60, The Secretary General, 
Development & International Economic Co-operation: Environment, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987). 
18. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, corrected by 
1987 O.J. L 304/46 [hereinafter SEA] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 12). 
19. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1 [hereinafter 
Maastricht Treaty]. 
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Although the case law of the ECJ had specifically dealt with 
environmental protection before then,20 this phase was notable 
because, for the first time, the objectives of the environmental 
policy were enshrined in the EEC Treaty. The inclusion in the 
EEC Treaty of provisions designed specifically to protect the 
environment confirmed the Community’s task in developing a 
European environmental policy. In particular, a new provision 
was inserted, EEC Treaty article 130r(2), which stated: 
“Environmental protection requirements shall be a component 
of the Community’s other policies.”21 One could say, therefore, 
that the SEA gave birth to the integration principle as we now 
know it. 
Further changes were brought about at the time the 
Maastricht Treaty came into force on November 1, 1993. The text 
of EEC Treaty article 130r(2) was changed to: “Environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of other Community policies.”22 The 
changes brought by the Maastricht Treaty are obvious. First, the 
notion of “must be integrated” is much more forceful than the 
notion of “shall be a component.” Second, the phrase “the 
definition and implementation” makes this duty broader than 
the mere reference to “other policies.” 
Even more important were changes made by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997.23 The integration principle was “exported” 
from the environmental provisions in the EEC Treaty and 
promoted to a “general principle” of EC law. Article 6 of the 
(then) EC Treaty stated: “Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities 
 
20. See, e.g., Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Défense des Brûleurs 
d’huiles Usagées (ADBHU), Case 240/83, [1985] E.C.R. 531. 
21. EEC Treaty, supra note 12, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, amended by SEA, supra note 18, 
art. 130r(2), 1987 O.J. L 169/1, at 17, reprinted as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 207 (EC Off’l Pub. Off. 1987). 
22. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 19, art. G(38), 1992 O.J. C 191/1, at 36–37; see 
also Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 
130r(2), 1992 O.J. C 224/1, at 52 [hereinafter EC Treaty 1992 Consolidated Version]. 
23. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1 
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
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referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.”24 
The general formulation makes it clear that the operation of 
the integration principle extends to the entire EC Treaty. Also 
new is the introduction of the clause “in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development.”25 With respect to the latter, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam clarified the constitutional status of 
“sustainable development” in the European legal order. The text 
of article 2 of the EC Treaty as amended by Amsterdam read that 
the Community shall have as its task promoting a “harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities.”26 This 
formulation was much more in line with internationally accepted 
practice in the environmental policy area than the “old” text, in 
which article 2 referred to “[the] promot[ion], throughout the 
Community, of a harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
respecting the environment.”27 “Sustainable growth” in the “old” 
article 2 of the EC Treaty was criticized as being a departure from 
the more usual formulation “sustainable development.”28 From 
the point of view of environmental protection, the concept of 
“sustainable growth” seemed marginally weaker than that of 
“sustainable development.” 
On each occasion that the EEC Treaty was amended, the 
integration principle was strengthened. Each round of revisions 
enhanced the profile and its impact. One could probably say that 
the integration principle in its Amsterdam version was at its peak. 
After the Treaty of Amsterdam, the legal status of the integration 
principle became blurred. First, confusion was brought about by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(“Charter”), as signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the 
European Parliament, the Council, and the European 
 
24. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 
6, 1997 O.J. C 340/173, at 183 [hereinafter EC Treaty 1997 Consolidated Version]. 
25. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 23, art. 2(4), 1997 O.J. C 340, at 24 (emphasis 
added). 
26. EC Treaty 1997 Consolidated Version, supra note 24, art. 2, 1997 O.J. C 340, at 
181 (emphasis added). 
27. EC Treaty 1992 Consolidated Version art. 2, 1992 O.J. C 224, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
28. See, e.g., European Commission, Development—Environmental Integration, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/environment/
integration/integrationhistory_ams_en.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
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Commission (“Commission”) at the European Council meeting 
in Nice on December 7, 2000.29 This Charter, as such of a non-
binding character at that time, also contained an integration 
principle. Article 37 of the Charter states: “A high level of 
environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of 
the environment must be integrated into the policies of the 
Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of 
sustainable development.”30 
The text of the Charter differs in a couple of aspects from 
the Amsterdam version. First, it refers only to Union policies and 
not to “policies and activities.”31 Second, it does not explicitly 
require integration as regards “the definition and 
implementation” of Union policies,32 thus rendering more 
uncertain its status vis-à-vis Member States. Third, integration is, 
according to the Charter, to be ensured in accordance with the 
principle of sustainable development, as opposed to “with a view 
to promote sustainable development.”33 Whatever the 
consequences of these differences might be, the damage done by 
article 37 of the Charter, if any, seems to be limited. 
A first serious attack on the integration principle was made 
during the discussions in the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, under the chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
which resulted from the text of the Draft Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (“Draft Treaty”), issued on June 20, 
2003.34 “For the environmental movement, these early drafts [of 
the proposed constitution] came as a nasty surprise. They caused 
widespread consternation, due to the manner in which they 
proposed a rolling back of the European Union’s environmental 
 
29. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. 
C 364/1 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
30. Id. art. 37, at 16. 
31. Compare Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 29, art. 37, 2000 O.J. C 364, 
at 17, with EC Treaty 1997 Consolidated Version, supra note 24, art. 6, 1997 O.J. C 340, 
at 183. 
32. Compare Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 29, art. 37, 2000 O.J. C 364, 
at 17 with EC Treaty 1997 Consolidated Version, supra note 24, art. 6, 1997 O.J. C 340, at 
183. 
33. Compare Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 29, art. 37, 2000 O.J. C 364, 
at 17, with EC Treaty 1997 Consolidated Version, supra note 24, art. 6, 1997 O.J. C 340, 
at 183. 
34. See generally Jan H. Jans & Joanne Scott, The Convention on the Future of Europe: 
An Environmental Perspective, 15 J. ENVTL. L. 323, 323 (2003). 
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dimension.”35 One of the most disconcerting elements of these 
early drafts was the exclusion (or, at the very least, the down-
grading) of the integration principle as a general principle of EC 
law. “The exclusion of the environmental integration obligation 
from the opening part of the proposed constitutional treaty led 
to disagreement between environmental activists and 
environmental academics. While all bemoaned its apparent fate, 
there was no consensus on how to proceed in the face of this 
adversity.”36 However, in the final version of the Draft Treaty, the 
integration principle was added, more or less on the final days of 
the Convention’s deliberations, to Title I, Part III: “Clauses of 
General Application.”37 Indeed, this was something of a victory 
for the environmental movement at that time. 
II. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INTEGRATION 
PRINCIPLE 
In general, one can say that the implications of the 
integration principle have been immense, at the political, 
administrative, and judicial level. Some major strengths will be 
discussed first. The so-called “enabling function”38 is arguably the 
most important legal consequence of the integration principle. 
According to article 5(1) Treaty on European Union (“TEU post-
Lisbon”), the limits of Union competences are governed by the 
so-called “principle of conferral.”39 Under that principle, “the 
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain 
the objectives set out therein.”40 The basic legal question, 
therefore, is whether the Union has any competence to take 
legally binding measures to ensure that protection of the 
environment is at least taken into consideration, even when 
 
35. Id. at 324. 
36. Id. at 326. 
37. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art. III-4, 2004 O.J. C 310/1 
(never ratified). 
38. See, e.g., Gerd Winter, Environmental Principles in Community Law, in THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 (Jan H. 
Jans ed., 2003). 
39. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(1), 2008 O.J. C 
115/13, at 18 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. The “enabling function” is also known as 
the “specific powers doctrine.” 
40. Id. art. 5(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 18. 
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commercial policy is involved or when other decisions are being 
taken, for example in the fields of agriculture, transport, energy, 
development aid, trade and external relations, internal market 
and competition policy, regional policy, etc.? The answer is yes! 
The case law of the ECJ demonstrates that environmental 
objectives can be pursued, for instance, in the context of the 
common commercial policy, internal market policy, and public 
procurement.41 The environmental integration principle 
broadens the objectives of the other powers laid down in the 
TFEU and thus limits the role of the specific powers doctrine in 
environmental policy. 
Perhaps equally important is the following legal 
consequence. In my opinion, European law can—and indeed 
must—be interpreted in the light of the environmental objectives 
of the TFEU, even with respect to areas outside the 
environmental field. One could call this the “guidance function” 
of the integration principle. For example, it has emerged as an 
important factor in justifying the application of the precautionary 
principle outside of the environmental sphere.42 Furthermore, 
with respect to the provisions on the free movement of goods, 
the principle has been key in justifying recourse to the Cassis de 
Dijon mandatory requirements, which now includes 
environmental protection, to justify a directly discriminatory 
barrier to trade.43 In general, one could say that the 
environmental integration principle played a key role in the 
transformation of a customs union initially called the European 
Economic Community into a political entity now called the 
European Union. 
Of course, there are a few known weaknesses of the 
environmental integration principle. It is still not clear what 
precisely has to be integrated and in what strength. Article 11 
TFEU (article 6 EC Treaty) refers to “[e]nvironmental 
 
41. See, e.g., Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin Kaupunki, Case C-513/99, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-7213; Pinaud Wieger Spedition GmbH v. Bundesanstalt für den 
Güterfernverkehr, Case C-17/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-5253; Greece v. Council, Case C-62/88, 
[1990] E.C.R. I-1527. 
42. In particular, the “guidance function” of the integration principle can be seen 
in relation to the protection of public health. See Artegodan GmbH v. Commission, 
Joined Cases T-74, 76, 83, 85, 132, 137, 141/00, [2002] E.C.R. II-4945, ¶ 183. 
43. See PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-2099. 
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protection requirements.”44 What should this be taken to mean? 
Certainly, it would seem to include the environment policy 
objectives of article 191(1) TFEU.45 It also seems likely that it 
includes the principles referred to in article 191(2) TFEU, such 
as the precautionary principle and the principle that preventive 
action should be taken.46 And finally, integration of the 
environment policy aspects referred to in article 191(3) TFEU 
should not a priori be excluded, though it is true that the TFEU 
does not state that these aspects have to be integrated, but only 
that they should be taken into account.47 There are a few studies 
on how “environmental protection requirements” have been 
integrated in practice. Two studies can be mentioned in 
particular: first, Vedder’s study on integrating environmental 
considerations in European competition law48 and, second, 
Dhondt’s treatise with respect to issues in agriculture, transport, 
and energy.49 While Vedder concluded that the model of 
integration is being applied in parts of European competition law 
and that, in those areas, competition policy towards 
environmental restrictions of competition actually increases the 
chances that competition for protecting the environment 
develops,50 Dhondt’s study made many “integration failures” 
visible in the domains of her research.51 
The next weakness concerns legal hierarchy. Does the 
integration principle imply that the EU’s environmental policy 
has been given some measure of priority over other European 
policy areas? Probably, it has not; at least if by “priority” it is 
meant that, in the event of a conflict with other policy areas, 
environmental policy has a certain added value from a legal 
point of view. The text of the TFEU does not support such a 
conclusion.52 The integration principle is designed to ensure that 
 
44. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 11, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53; EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 
6, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 42. 
45. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 191(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 132. 
46. Id. art. 191(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 132. 
47. Id. art. 191(3), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 133. 
48. HANS VEDDER, COMPETITION LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN 
EUROPE; TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY? (2003). 
49. NELE DHONDT, INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INTO OTHER EC 
POLICIES; LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2003). 
50. VEDDER, supra note 48, at 78–79. 
51. DHONDT, supra note 49, at 442–44. 
52. TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 191–93, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 132–34. 
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protection of the environment is at least taken into 
consideration, even when commercial or other policy decisions 
are being made. However, the manner in which potential and 
actual conflicts between protection of the environment and, for 
example, how the functioning of the internal market should be 
resolved cannot be inferred from the integration principle as 
such. 
A final weakness to be mentioned concerns the justiciability 
of the principle. Can the legitimacy of actions of the Council, 
European Parliament, and Commission be reviewed by the Court 
in the light of the principle? Can the validity of a directive or 
regulation, for example in the field of transport or agriculture, 
be questioned on the grounds that the decision has infringed 
upon essential environmental requirements? The case law of the 
ECJ shows that, in principle, such a review is possible. In the 
Bettati case, in which the lawfulness of Ozone Regulation 
3093/94 was disputed, the Court was prepared to examine the 
compatibility of a measure with the environmental objectives and 
principles of the EC Treaty.53 The ECJ noted, however, that the 
Union’s institutions have wide discretionary powers as to how 
they shape their environmental policy, and will have to balance 
the relative importance of the environmental objectives and 
other Union objectives as they proceed.54 Judicial review by the 
Court is therefore limited to the question of whether the Union 
legislator committed “a manifest error of appraisal.”55 
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION PRINCIPLE POST-
LISBON 
The current version of the environmental integration 
principle in article 11 TFEU reads: “Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development.”56 Compared 
to the Amsterdam version, there are no changes in the text as 
such. However, the integration principle no longer has the 
 
53. Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech Srl, Case C-341/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-4355, ¶¶ 17–18. 
54. Id. ¶¶ 32–35. 
55. Id. ¶ 35. 
56. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 11, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53. 
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special status of a “general principle of EC law.”57 Above, there 
were references to discussions in the Convention on the Future 
of Europe and some of the earlier drafts on a Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe where the integration principle was 
downgraded to “just a principle.”58 It looks, and surprisingly this 
time without any serious public debate, that the initial victory of 
maintaining its special status in the final text of the 
Constitutional Treaty was celebrated too soon. Instead, the 
environmental integration principle according to Title II of the 
TFEU has, together with some other integration principles, 
become a provision “[h]aving [g]eneral [a]pplication.”59 It could 
be argued that the legal significance of such a downgrading is 
rather limited, if any. But from a policy point of view, the 
symbolism of such a downgrading could prove to be of great 
importance. Future developments will tell whether or not that is 
true. 
From a legal point of view, it is probably more important 
that according to the new article 6 of the TEU post-Lisbon, the 
Charter “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”60 From 
a non-binding declaration, the Charter became a document with 
the same legal status and hierarchy as the TEU post-Lisbon and 
the TFEU. That triggers the question of what might be the legal 
consequences of the differences between article 11 TFEU on the 
one hand and article 37 of the Charter on the other. As the 
obligation contained in article 37 of the Charter seems to be 
more limited than the one in article 11 TFEU, an interpretation 
of article 11 TFEU in line with the Charter may result in a further 
downgrading. 
The following could prove to be even more important. At 
the time the environmental integration principle was inserted in 
the EEC Treaty by the SEA,61 it was the only integration principle 
in the EC Treaty. This exclusivity alone made the principle 
significant. Nowadays, the environmental integration principle is 
only one among many other integration principles. One could 
even say that the Lisbon Treaty caused a true proliferation of 
 
57. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
58. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
59. TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 7–17, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53–55. 
60. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 39, art. 6(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19. 
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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integration principles. According to article 7 TFEU, the Union 
shall “ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with 
the principle of conferral of powers.”62 Article 8 TFEU requires 
that the Union “[i]n all its activities . . . shall aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and 
women.”63 Article 9 TFEU states: “In defining and implementing 
its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of 
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the 
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, 
training and protection of human health.”64 
This is followed by article 10 TFEU: “In defining and 
implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”65 
Furthermore, “[c]onsumer protection requirements shall be taken 
into account in defining and implementing other Union policies 
and activities”66 according to article 12 TFEU. Finally, article 13 
TFEU requires that “full regard” is being paid to the welfare 
requirements of animals.67 The result is a genuine melting pot: 
everything has to be taken into account with everything! 
IV. HOW TO ASSESS THE POST-LISBON PROLIFERATION? 
Above it was argued that one of the weaknesses of the pre-
Lisbon version of the integration principle was the limited 
justiciability of it. It was also argued that the requirement to 
integrate environmental considerations does not imply that 
environmental considerations have some sort of legal priority 
compared to other genuine policy objectives and considerations. 
It is the author’s opinion that these weaknesses will become 
even more apparent now that the Lisbon Treaty is in force. The 
already difficult task of the European legislator to balance 
sometimes conflicting interests has become even more complex. 
 
62. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 7, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53. 
63. Id. art. 8, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53. 
64. Id. art. 9, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. art. 10, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 53 (emphasis added). 
66. Id. art. 12, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 54 (emphasis added). 
67. Id. art. 13, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 54 (emphasis added). 
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It is my prediction that the ECJ will show even more 
deference to the EU’s political institutions than before in this 
balancing act and will become even more reluctant to reach the 
conclusion that the European legislator committed “a manifest 
error of appraisal.”68 The case law of the ECJ in the context of, 
for instance, the common agricultural policy demonstrates the 
reluctance of the Court to intervene in matters where the Union 
legislator has to weigh various objectives against each other.69 
The Court acknowledges that the Union institutions have wide 
discretionary powers when harmonizing policy in relation to the 
various objectives contained in article 39 TFEU (increasing 
productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community, stabilizing markets, assuring the stability of supplies, 
and ensuring supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices).70 
One or more of these objectives may (temporarily) be given 
priority, as long as the policy does not become so focused on a 
single objective that the attainment of other objectives is made 
impossible. Only rarely will the Court find that these 
discretionary powers have been exceeded. 
Another consequence of the Lisbon proliferation has to do 
with the principle of conferral, by which “the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by 
the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein,”71 has an important role in the debate of division of 
powers between the Union and its Member States. It means that 
the competences not conferred upon the Union in the treaties 
remain with the Member States. The requirement to balance 
multiple objectives, according to the multiplicity of integration 
principles, makes it more difficult to draw a clear line between 
Union and Member State competences. The blurrier the 
objectives become, the blurrier the division of powers between 
Union and Member States are. 
A third negative consequence of this proliferation of 
integration principles could be called the “minestrone effect.” 
Like the mixture of ingredients in minestrone, decision-making 
on the basis of multiple integration principles could result in 
 
68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
69. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 7, at 18. 
70. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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measures where the component elements are still visible, but not 
as sharply and clearly as before. There is, therefore, an inherent 
danger that under the disguise of integration, certain 
environmental standards will be diluted or offset against other 
interests and policy considerations. As an ultimate consequence, 
it might result in what could be called “reversed integration,” a 
process by which certain environmental standards, such as 
environmental quality standards or emission standards, are 
lowered as a consequence of the requirement that other than 
environmental interests are to be taken into account. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
INTEGRATION PRINCIPLE? 
Although not perfect, the “old” environmental integration 
principle served its purpose in merging environmental 
considerations with other policies. However, the proliferation of 
integration principles brought about by the Lisbon Treaty has 
resulted in the weakening of the current environmental 
integration principle and could, ultimately, even act as a “Trojan 
horse” and lead to a weakening, or even a downgrading, of 
environmental standards. It is the author’s opinion that the 
Lisbon Treaty made us aware that an environmental integration 
principle is only to serve its purpose if it has a certain exclusivity 
and not if it is just one of the many different integration 
principles. 
Above was stated that on each occasion that the founding 
treaties were amended, the environmental integration principle 
was strengthened. The Lisbon Treaty brought an end to that 
pattern. That is a rather sad conclusion. 
Gordon Slynn showed us in his opinion in the Danish Bottles 
case that a balancing of interests between the free movement of 
goods and environmental protection raises difficult and sensitive 
issues. That was the case on May 24, 1988 and still is today. 
